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ABSTRACT
The management of endangered species as metapopulations is becoming increasingly common. Diverse as-
pects of metapopulation dynamics and management have received attention in recent years. In particular,
translocation of individuals between subpopulations of a metapopulation is practiced, or envisaged, for a
variety of reasons and requires careful consideration. Linklater (2003) proposed that the number of individ-
uals of each sex translocated into a target population for the purposes of maintaining genetic diversity could
be chosen on the basis of parental investment theory. In this paper, following basic ideas in the parental
investment literature, I propose a simple model to capture Linklater’s proposal and provide a thorough
mathematical analysis of the model. Granted the necessary species-specific biological information which
would determine the model parameters in any instance of application, the analysis indicates that a practical
algorithm can be constructed to generate the model’s predictions for the optimal translocation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many endangered species now exist in fragmented habitat and are managed as meta-populations, the
subspecies of black rhino Diceros bicornis of Africa providing notable examples. This situation poses many
problems as regards reserve design, population dynamics, and management. In particular, reduced possibility,
or even impossibility, of natural dispersal in such circumstances reduces genetic flow between subpopulations
and may decrease productivity and increase risk of local extinction due to reduced fitness and stochastic
effects (e.g., Soule´ 1987).
Translocation of individuals is one option for maintaining genetic flow between artificially isolated sub-
populations of a given (sub)species. Given the inherent risks and practical challenges (e.g., Maguire et al.
1987, Brett 1998, Miller et al. 1999, Fischer & Lindenmayer 2000) involved in this practice, choosing strate-
gies that optimize the reproductive return from translocation efforts and enhance metapopulation persistence
is sound policy. A variety of issues have received theoretical treatment (the following list and literature are
not intended to be exhaustive): which life stages are optimal for translocation (Hearne & Swart 1991, Robert
et al. 2004); the role of captive populations (Tenhumberg et al. 2004, McPhee & Silverman 2004); decision
making in the face of limited resources and uncertainties (Maguire 1986, Haight et al. 2000); metapopulation
dynamics modelling (Hearne & Swart 1991, Wootton & Bell 1992, Lubow 1996); rate of genetic flow required
(Wang 2004).
As some of these studies emphasize, the goal of translocation is not just to merely supplement numbers
but also to enhance reproductive performance and maintain genetic flow. Hence, the reproductive perfor-
mance of the translocated individuals in the target population should be a primary concern and a measure
of the success of a translocation. Linklater (2003) argued that managers planning a translocation can be
viewed as parents, constrained by limited resources, investing in offspring and suggested that translocations
be modelled in terms of parental investment theory. Application to a specific species will then depend on
assumptions regarding reproductive behaviour and how individuals respond to investment.
In a polygynous, sexually reproducing species, all females are expected to reproduce while only the
fittest males are likely to obtain reproductive opportunities. Trivers and Willard (1973) argued that for
such species natural selection should result in a mechanism that enables a mother to influence, presumably
at conception, the sex of her offspring so as to gain the optimal return on her investment in that offspring
from the resources available to her at that time. Specifically, they predicted that when a mother is in poor
condition she should produce daughters rather than sons and invest more in the daughters she does produce,
while when in good condition she should produce sons rather than daughters and invest more in the sons
she produces. These predictions presume that the condition of the mother determines her ability to invest in
her offspring, that investment in offspring translates into the condition of that offspring at sexual maturity,
and reflect that, in the polygynous context of the considerations, males require a competitive edge to gain
mating opportunities so only a mother in good condition is in a position to produce such a son while mothers
in poor condition are better off investing their more limited resources in females.
While there has been some controversy about what Trivers and Willard actually meant, see for example
Carranza (2002), Cameron and Linklater (2002) have argued forcefully for the interpretation outlined above.
Moreover, Cameron et al. (1999) and Cameron & Linklater (2000) found evidence for the Trivers-Willard
(TW) effect in wild horses in New Zealand consistent with their interpretation. Although there have been
many studies of the TW effect, with mixed results, Cameron (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of mammalian
sex-ratio studies and reported that much of the inconsistency in results can be attributed to the variety of
indices of maternal condition employed. Studies that utilized indices of maternal condition near conception
provided almost unanimous support for the TW effect. In addition, Cameron (2004) described a possible
mechanism for facultative adjustment of sex ratio, through the effect of blood-glucose levels on blastocysts,
which would be consistent with the TW effect. Subtleties of life history of a species may confound the
prediction of which sex benefits more from maternal investment (Clark 1978, Leimar 1996, Sheldon & West
2004) but does not necessarily undermine the general argument of Trivers & Willard.
Linklater (2003) specifically proposed that the TW effect could be adapted as a model for how managers
should invest resources in translocation operations for meta-population management of polygynous species
such as black rhino; specifically, that the number of males and females to be released into a given target
population, and the partition of resources amongst them, should be modelled as a function of the resources
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available using the TW effect as the underlying principle. Optimization of such a model would then provide
the recommended translocation strategy for managers to adopt in a given circumstance. The approach
envisaged by Linklater would constitute an important component of metapopulation management.
In this paper, I present a simple model of reproductive returns on investment in translocations. Lin-
klater’s specific proposal would be incorporated by appropriate choice of return functions for males and
females. I describe the model in §§2–4, basic elements of which are adapted from ideas in Frank (1987).
Solution of the model involves two optimization problems, which are solved in §§5–9. These solutions, along
with numerical case studies, indicate both the generality and practicality of the model.
2. INGREDIENTS OF THE MODEL
The aim is to model the return on investment in a translocation, where, by return, I mean a measure of
the reproductive success of the translocated animals (which reflects the transfer of alleles into the population).
By fixed costs are meant necessary costs independent of the number of animals translocated which do
not yield any return. In the modelling, the available resources shall mean the resources after the exclusion
of fixed costs.
Packaging costs are, by definition, costs per individual released which do not contribute to the animal’s
success, i.e., there is no return on packaging costs, but these costs must be included in the model. An
example might be transportation costs, but in general packaging costs will be specific to each translocation
effort and may well be gender specific.
I assume that the resources invested in an individual yield a reproductive return that can be modelled
by a suitable return function of said resources. I further assume that the return function is fixed for each
gender in any given application. In reality, for a given species, a particular life stage may be optimal for
translocation. One might therefore always choose individuals from that life stage or, with greater difficulty,
allow different return functions for different life stages of each gender in the modelling.
Let x denote the proportion of available resources to be invested in males and z the proportion invested
in females, whence x + z = 1. I denote the return function for a male by m(x) and that for a female by
f(z). The choice of return function for each gender models expected response to investment of resources and
behavioural assumptions about the species; in particular, appropriate choices incorporate the TW effect into
the model. Beyond the choice of return functions, there are three further steps in the modelling process:
determining how to invest a given level of resources in a given gender; combining the results of the previous
step to find the overall return from investment in both genders; computing the optimal overall return and
hence the recommended translocation strategy.
Note that even if there were an ideal return function that models the behaviour of individuals of a given
gender of a given species in the context of unlimited resources, the return function employed in a given
application must reflect the available resources. In particular, while returns no doubt level off in the face of
unlimited resources, in the context of limited resources such behaviour may not be evident. This fact may
mean that functions which are unrealistic return functions in the context of unlimited resources might serve
over limited ranges of resources. It may also be the case that one knows only an approximation to the actual
return function.
For this reason, and for some mathematical generality, I treat a collection of candidate return functions
which are nondecreasing and simply characterized by their rates of change, specifically, by their first and
second derivatives. Each be regarded as approximations to the sigmoid in appropriate circumstances.
3. INVESTING IN A SINGLE GENDER
In this section I will employ the notation appropriate for males; it is modified for females in a straight-
forward manner. When resources x are partitioned into x =
∑n
i=1 xi, with xi applied to the i’th of n
individuals, the total return is
M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn) :=
n∑
i=1
m(xi). (3.1)
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For given x, also define
M(x) := max
(n;x1,...,xn)
x1+···+xn=x
M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn). (3.2)
M(x) is the return from the optimal assignment of resources x to males with individual return function
m(x). Similarly, one defines a function F(z) for females.
3.a Step-Function Returns
Suppose each male requires a certain minimal investment a, beyond the packaging cost d, before any
return on investment occurs and that any investment at and beyond a+d results in a fixed return rm. Then
the return function for a single male is a step function:
m(x) =
{
rm, if x ∈ [a+ d, 1];
0, if x ∈ [0, a+ d). (3.a.1)
By the nature of this individual return function, for resources x the optimal strategy is to release nm males
where nm = [x/(a+ d)]i, with [ ]i denoting the integral part of the bracketed number. It follows that
M(x) = rm
[
x
a+ d
]
i
. (3.a.2)
3.b Linear Returns
Suppose the returns are linear functions of investment beyond the packaging costs:
m(x) =
{
a(x− d) if x ∈ [d, 1];
0 if x ∈ [0, d]. (3.b.1)
If resources x are partitioned amongst n males, then
M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
m(xi) =
n∑
i=1
a(xi − d) = a(x− nd). (3.b.2)
Due to the nonzero packaging costs, the optimal strategy is to choose n = 1, whence
M(x) = m(x). (3.b.3)
3.c Increasing-Marginal-Return (IMR) Functions
In this case the return function is increasing with increasing marginal returns (the graph is concave up),
which may be characterized as follows: the function is zero on [0, d] and on [d, 1] satisfies
m(d) = 0 m′(x) > 0 m′′(x) > 0. (3.c.1)
One can use the result of the Appendix A to solve the optimization problem. As usual, it makes sense
to assign each male invested in at least d of the resources. Suppose one has so invested in n males. Put
yj = xj − d > 0, j = 1, . . . , n. Since m′ is injective (m′′ > 0 implies m′ strictly increasing) on the relevant
domain, (A.5) has a unique solution y1 = · · · = yn. But, as m′′ > 0, the Hessian in (A.6) is positive
definite at this critical point, i.e., one has a local minimum, not a maximum. So equal apportionment is the
least optimal strategy in this case when resources are divided amongst several individuals. It follows from
Appendix A that the optimal strategy is to invest in a single individual, whence M(x) = m(x). The linear
return of 3.b is a limiting instance of this case.
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3.d Diminishing-Marginal-Return (DMR) Functions
In this case the return function is increasing with decreasing marginal returns (the graph is concave
down), characterized by a return function m which is zero on [0, d], while on [d, 1],
m(d) = 0 m′(x) > 0 m′′(x) < 0. (3.d.1)
One may require the function to have a horizontal asymptote, in which case limx→∞m
′(x) = 0.
From Appendix A, since m′′ < 0 on (d, 1], m′ is injective on this subinterval. Hence, for n satisfying
(A.2), (A.5) again has a unique solution: y1 = · · · = yn is the only critical point and the Hessian (A.6) is
negative definite, i.e., this critical point is a local maximum.
Thus, equal apportionment of resources x > d is the optimal strategy amongst n individuals, for n
satisfying (A.2). For fixed x and n, the optimal return is therefore
M(x;n) := nm(x/n). (3.d.2)
It remains to optimize with respect to n subject to (A.2):
M(x) = max
0<n<x/d
M(x;n) (3.d.3)
with the understanding that when x ≤ d there are no such n and M(x) = 0, i.e., M(x) = 0 on [0, d]. Note
that on (d, 2d], n = 1 is the only possibility, so in fact
M(x) = m(x) on [0, 2d]. (3.d.4)
Consider the function φx(v) := vm(x/v) for fixed x ∈ (d, 1]. The restriction vd < x entails one may
take the domain of φx to be (0, x/d). With v ∈ (0, x/d), x/v ∈ (d,∞), whence φx is smooth on its domain
if m is smooth on (d,∞), which is presumed. Differentiating with respect to v yields:
φ′x(v) = m(x/v)−
(x
v
)
m′(x/v);
(3.d.5)
φ′′x(v) =
x2
v3
m′′(x/v).
Since m′′ < 0 on (d,∞), and x and v are positive, then φ′′x < 0 on its domain, i.e., φx is concave down on
(0, x/d), whence has a local maximum which is its global maximum. Let vx denote the value of v for which
this maximum occurs, i.e., vx solves φ
′
x(vx) = 0. Putting tx := x/vx ∈ (d,∞), then
m(tx) = txm
′(tx); equivalently m
′(tx) =
m(tx)
tx
. (3.d.6)
This equation has a simple geometric interpretation; namely, the tangent line to m at tx coincides with the
line through the point
(
tx,m(tx)
)
and the origin (since they have a point in common and the same slope).
As m is concave down for x > d > 0 and zero on [0, d], there is a unique line through the origin and tangent
to m. This geometric fact characterizes tx and indicates it is independent of x. Thus, one may write t,
defined by
m′(t) =
m(t)
t
. (3.d.7)
If one did not require integral values, then the optimal n for given x would be nx = vx = x/t, which is
a simple linear function of x. Since, however, n must be integral, because of the concave down shape of φx,
the optimal n for given x is the integer either side of x/t yielding the largest return:
nx =
[x
t
]
i
or
[x
t
]
i
+ 1 according as
[x
t
]
i
m
(
x
[x/t]i
)
>
([x
t
]
i
+ 1
)
m
(
x
[x/t]i + 1
)
or not.
(3.d.8)
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Thus, for a given x there are just two candidates for nx. Notice that for d < x < t, [x/t]i = 0, whence nx
must be 1. In particular, if t ≥ 1, then nx = 1 for all x ∈ (d, 1].
3.d.9 Observation
Given m as in (3.d.1), if the solution t of (3.d.7) satisfies t ≥ 1 then
M(x) = m(x).
If t < 1, however, as x increases, so does x/t and so the trend in nx should be increasing. Note that
although t is independent of x, φx is not; in particular, its critical point vx = x/t changes with x, as does
the domain (0, x/d). In general,M(x) = nxm(x/nx).
Explicit examples of (3.d.1) are: on [d, 1]:
h(x) = K(x−d)s K > 0, 0 < s < 1 g(x) = K
(
1−
(
d
x
)s)
s > 0. (3.d.10)
The functions h are derived from the cumulative distribution function for certain β-distributions and were
considered by Frank (1987). They increase without bound. The functions g exhibit a horizontal asymptote
at y = K; consequently, g is bounded. Note also that for s≫ 1, g(1) ≈ K, so by an appropriate choice of s
one can ensure that g approaches its bound on the interval [0, 1].
For the function h, the solution of (3.d.7) is t = d/(1 − s) > d but increases without bound as s → 1.
In particular, t ≥ 1 ⇔ s ≥ 1− d. For such s, (3.d.9) is valid. Note that as s→ 1, the function h is almost
linear, whence the result just noted is consistent with the results for linear return functions. In general,
vx = (1− s)(x/d).
For the function g, the solution of (3.d.7) is t = s
√
s+ 1 d > d. Taking the logarithm and using
L’Hoˆpital’s rule shows that lims→∞
s
√
s+ 1 = 1 while lims→0
s
√
s+ 1 = e, i.e., d < t < de as s ranges from∞
down towards 0. If r
√
r + 1 d = 1, for some r ∈ (0,∞), then s√s+ 1 d ≥ 1 for 0 < s ≤ r. But t ≥ 1 requires
1 < de, i.e., d > 1/e ≈ 0.37. In particular, if d ≤ 1/e, then t < 1. So, if d is less than 0.37, then (3.d.9) is
inapplicable. In general, vx = [1/
s
√
s+ 1](x/d).
3.e Sigmoid Return Functions
One need not restrict to the logistic g(x) = 1/[1 + exp(−x)]. One only requires, on [d, 1],
m(d) = 0 m′(x) > 0
(3.e.1)
and for some p, d < p < 1, m′′(x)
{
> 0, for x ∈ [d, p);
< 0, for x ∈ (p, 1].
Demanding a horizontal asymptote requires limx→∞m
′(x) = 0. Assuming that m is C2, then
m′′(p) = 0. (3.e.2)
For any given x, and n satisfying (A.2), critical points of M(x;n, x1, . . . , xn) satisfy (A.5). If x1, . . . , xn
are all less than p, then as m′ is injective on (d, p), as in (3.3) x1 = · · · = xn and such a critical point gives a
local minimum of the return function. This phenomenon obviously occurs for x < p for which m is exactly
as in (3.e). Assuming continuity of M, for x ≤ p, M(x) = m(x).
When x > p, it becomes possible to have solutions of (A.5) with xj 6= xk, in which case xj < p and
xk > p say. But the Hessian (A.6) of such a critical point is indefinite. By (A.5), m
′(xj) = m
′(xk). To first
order, diverting a small amount of the resources xk from the k’th individual to the j’th individual exactly
balances. But, to second order, since m′′(xk) < 0 while m
′′(xj) > 0, the return from individual k will decline
while that from individual j will increase. The overall change in return will depend, to second order, on the
relative magnitudes of m′′(xk) and m
′′(xj). Such critical points are saddle points.
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If x is large enough that x/n > p, then x/n = x1 = · · · = xn is a solution of (A.5) and (A.6) indicates it
yields a local maximum amongst all partitions of x into n amounts (including those partitions for which some
xj are less than p). Unlike in (3.d), a local maximum may fail here to be the absolute maximum because
of the partitions containing xj < p (the saddle-point critical points provide stationary points where the
function may start to increase in certain directions and thereby ultimately exceed the value of the function
at the local maximum). If so, the maximum for this value of n must occur on the boundary of the domain
and the argument of Appendix A still entails that the optimal strategy for investing resources x is equal
apportionment amongst n individuals for some n satisfying (A.2).
In summary, the optimal strategy when x > p is amongst the strategies nm(x/n), nd < x, x/n > p.
Note that when x < p, there is no such n, whence n = 1 is the optimal strategy, so the earlier deduction
for the case x < p may be included in this characterization. Hence, the situation may be regarded as a
generalization of that in (3.d).
Indeed, as in (3.d), one can consider the function φx(v) := vm(x/v). The calculations (3.d.5) are
unchanged. Again, one finds that there exists a t satisfying (3.d.7) which yields the unique critical point for
φx. Put vx := x/t as before. In the present circumstances,
φ′′x(vx) =
x2
v3x
m′′(t).
By the shape of the sigmoid graph, t > p, whence m′′(t) < 0. Thus, vx is the unique local maximum of φx.
Moreover, since only those n for which x/n > p are of interest here, one can restrict v so that x/v > p, i.e.,
φx is indeed concave down on the domain of interest. So, as in (3.d), one can solve (3.d.7) for t and then the
optimal strategy is as in (3.d.8). In particular, x ≤ t ⇒ nx = 1 and (3.d.9) is valid for sigmoid returns too.
Observe that if p is close to 1, then the sigmoid function is approximately as in (3.3), while if p is close
to 0, then the sigmoid is approximately as in (3.d). Moreover, the step-function return may be viewed as
an extreme limiting form of the sigmoid, while the linear return is a limiting form of both (3.c) and (3.d)
and thus an approximation to certain sigmoids. One would therefore expect some unifying perspective on
the results obtained in this section. For example, the optimal strategy for step functions was similar to that
in (3.d) being also equal apportionment but with the difference that it was amongst the maximum possible
number of individuals. That said, the line through the origin that touches the nonzero part of the step
function goes through the point x = a+ d, i.e., for the step function, although (3.d.7) is not applicable, the
geometric construction of t would give t = a + d, which is consistent with (3.d.7) in that t is the amount
of resources one would ideally equally apportion (without the integral requirement imposed on v) amongst
individuals.
Indeed, a unifying viewpoint is as follows. For any return function m(x), the quantity m(x)/x is the
return per unit resource. This quantity is maximal for the point of the graph of m(x) where the steepest
line through the origin touches the graph. Denoting by t this value of x, m(t)/t is the maximal value of the
return per unit resource. Since optimal investment in the cases studied here never involves unequal partition
of resources amongst several individuals, one may restrict attention to equal division of resources x into
amounts y amongst individuals, which yields a return of (x/y).m(y) = x.m(y)/y, and the optimal strategy
would be ideally xm(t)/t. Since the number of individuals must be integral, the actual optimal strategy is
the best approximation to this ideal strategy. This argument reproduces, at least, the final result in each
case (a)–(e) above. For step-function returns, t = a + d; for IMR functions (including linear), t = 1 and,
although equal division of resources amongst several individuals is not actually optimal in any sense, the
optimal strategy is to invest all resources x in a single individual, which does amount to t = 1; for DMR
and sigmoid functions, t is characterized by (3.d.7) (when m(x) is smooth, elementary calculus shows that
m(x)/x has a critical point satisfying (3.d.7) which is a local maximum when m′′ < 0 at the critical point).
It is noteworthy that when one computes M(x) = nxm(x/nx) for (3.d.10) and the example sigmoid
function of §6.c, the resulting graph ofM(x) appears to represent a continuous function of x. I consider this
issue in Appendix B, which results, for some return functions, in a simple procedure for obtaining M.
4. THE MODEL
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In order for male and female reproductive returns to be comparable, male returns must be weighted
by reproductive opportunities, which is achieved by multiplying by the appropriate sex ratio of the target
population. Let S := φ/µ denote the ratio of reproductively active females to reproductively active males
in the target population prior to the release and let SP denote the same ratio after the release, where the
subscript indicates that SP depends on the actual partitioning of resources through the numbers of each
gender released. While the interpretation of φ and µ may depend on the species considered, since the
aim of any translocation is to introduce breeding stock into the target population, I will assume that each
translocated animal is included in SP .
The model I pose is as follows. Let d denote the packaging costs for males and δ that for females. With
notation as in (3.1), define
R1(x) := max
x1+···+xn=x
z1+···+zk=1−x
[M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn)SP + F (1− x; k; z1, . . . , zk)], (4.1)
where the maximization is over all permissible partitions:
n <
x
d
,
n∑
i=1
xi = x, yi := xi − d ∈ (0, x− nd);
k <
1− x
δ
,
k∑
j=1
zj = 1− x, wj := zj − δ ∈ (0, 1− x− kδ).
Investment in a individual which yields no return is suboptimal for that gender. Moreover, such individuals
should not count in SP and so cannot enhance overall returns. Hence, such investment is suboptimal across
genders and therefore need not be considered.
For target populations with a large number of both males and females relative to the number of releases,
SP ≈ S and a simplified model results by replacing SP by S. In this case, since S is constant, the optimization
in (4.1) splits into separate optimizations of each summand, each of which then assumes the form as in (3.2)
and (4.1) becomes
R2(x) :=M(x)S + F(1 − x). (4.2)
One might wonder whether (4.1) ever reduces to
R3(x) :=M(x)Sx + F(1− x), (4.3)
where Sx denotes the sex ratio of the post-release population for the optimal divisions of resources x amongst
males and of 1 − x amongst females. I shall consider this question case by case. I shall refer to (4.1) as
Model 1, (4.2) as Model 2, and (4.3) as Model 3.
It follows from the considerations in §3 that for each x ∈ [0, 1] there are only finitely many possible
strategies over which one must optimize to form M, F , R2 and R1, whence each of these functions is well
defined. When m and f are continuous, it follows, as argued in Appendix B, that M and F are each
continuous, whence R2 is continuous. Thus, Model 2 is well defined in that R2 always possesses a maximal
return on [0, 1]. The continuity of R1 depends, however, on the factor SP , which may vary discontinuously.
Thus, R1, while bounded on [0, 1], if discontinuous may not achieve its supremum (least upper bound). I
will discuss this issue in the context in which it arises.
In the case of (4.2), ifM(x) and F(1− x) are smooth functions of x, then R′2(x) =M′(x)S−F ′(1− x)
and the critical points are given by
M′(x)S = F ′(1 − x), (4.4)
with a local maximum ensured by
0 > R′′2 (x) =M′′(x)S + F ′′(x). (4.5)
The optimal strategy would then be at such a local maximum or at x = 0 or x = 1. Since (4.4–5) require
analytic expressions for M and F , they are rarely a practical method of solution.
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In the following sections, I conduct case studies of Models 1 and 2. The purpose of these studies is to
explore the mathematical behaviour of the model and present solutions to various scenarios. The biological
relevance of these case studies is not explicitly considered, but see the discussion. For notational convenience,
when (fe)males, are modelled with a return function as in 3a – e, I shall refer to step-function, linear, IMR,
DMR, or sigmoid (fe)males, respectively. I do not explicitly study return functions of type 3c in the following
case studies though it would not be difficult to do so. The results for linear returns indicate what to expect
for returns of type 3c.
5. STEP-FUNCTION MALES AND FEMALES
The individual return function for males is as in (3.a.1), while the individual return function for females
is:
f(z) =
{
rf , if x ∈ [α+ δ, 1];
0, if x ∈ [0, α+ δ). (5.1)
Such return functions might be appropriate for modelling in situations where there is a regime of fixed
investment per individual and only a knowledge of average returns modelled as a flat return; in particular,
translocations called hard releases.
As we saw in (3.a), the resulting optimal strategy for assigning resources x to males is
M(x) = rm
[
x
a+ d
]
i
. (5.2)
Similarly, the optimal strategy for assigning resources z to females is
F(z) = rf
[
z
α+ δ
]
i
. (5.3)
Observe that if a + d + α + δ > 1, then the resources are sufficient only for investment in either males or
females. If, further, both a + d ≤ 1 and α + δ ≤ 1, then both options are available. For an investment
exclusively in females the optimal return is rf .[1/(α + δ)]i. For an investment exclusively in males, the
possibilities are rmnφ/(µ + n), n = 1, . . . , [1/(a + d)]i. Observing that n/(µ + n) is an increasing function
of n, the optimal return is rm[1/(a+ d)]iSP . (This last fact remains true if SP is replaced by S.) Thus, one
need only compare these two expressions to decide whether it is more optimal to invest in females or males.
Now suppose (a+ d) + (α+ δ) ≤ 1, equivalently, a+ d ≤ 1− α− δ, so that investment in both genders
is possible. First consider Model 2:
R2(x) = rm
[
x
a+ d
]
i
S + rf
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
. (5.4)
One can analyse this situation conceptually. Suppose
1 = p(a+ d) + ǫ1, p a nonnegative integer, 0 ≤ ǫ1 < (a+ d). (5.5)
On each subinterval of the form
[
s(a+d), (s+1)(a+d)
)
, s = 0, . . . , p−1, and on [p(a+d), 1],M is constant
and given by M(s(a + d)) while F is nonincreasing. Thus, R2 assumes its largest value on each of these
subintervals at the initial point of the subinterval (though not necessarily uniquely so). It follows that the
optimal strategy for R2 occurs at one of:
x = s(a+ d), s = 0, . . . , p. (5.6)
Note that there may be other values of x at which an equally optimal strategy occurs. Such values arise
because neither M nor F may change for small changes in x. For example, the analogous approach to
(5.7) based on increments of α + δ would proceed in such increments down from 1 towards 0. Note that
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the resulting points y = 1 − ℓ(α + δ) may not have any points in common with (5.7). If not, this fact is
explained by the previous remark. As long as one finds some x that gives the optimal strategy, it is a matter
of convenience what form one takes; unless there are restrictions on the number of males or females available
for translocation. Here I take the form given by (5.7); but the second approach will prove convenient in the
next section for case studies with step-function females and male returns of other forms.
If a+ d ≥ α+ δ, write
a+ d = q(α+ δ) + ǫ2, q a nonnegative integer, 0 ≤ ǫ2 < α+ δ. (5.7)
To compute the difference in return R2 between x = s(a+ d) and x = (s+ 1)(a+ d), suppose
1− s(a+ d) = ℓs(α+ δ) + ǫs, ℓs a nonnegative integer, 0 ≤ ǫs < α+ δ. (5.8)
Then
R2
(
s(a+ d)
)
= srmS + rf ℓs
while
R2
(
(s+ 1)(a+ d)
)
= (s+ 1)rmS + rf
[
1− (s+ 1)(a+ d)
α+ δ
]
i
.
By assumption 0 ≤ 1− (s+1)(a+ d), whence 1− (s+1)(a+ d)+ (a+ d) = 1− s(a+ d) yields ℓs+1(α+ δ)+
ǫs+1+ q(α+ δ)+ ǫ2 = ℓs(α+ δ)+ ǫs, which entails ℓs ≥ q. Hence, 1− (s+1)(a+d) = (ℓs− q)(α+ δ)+ ǫs− ǫ2,
and [
1− (s+ 1)(a+ d)
α+ δ
]
i
=
{
ℓs − q, if ǫs ≥ ǫ2;
ℓs − q − 1, if ǫs < ǫ2.
Thus,
R2
(
(s+ 1)(a+ d)
)−R2(s(a+ d)) = rmS −
{
rf q, if ǫs ≥ ǫ2;
rf (q + 1), if ǫs < ǫ2,
i.e.,
R2
(
(s+ 1)(a+ d)
) ≥ R2(s(a+ d)) ⇔ rmS
rf
≥


[
a+d
α+δ
]
i
, if ǫs ≥ ǫ2;[
a+d
α+δ
]
i
+ 1, if ǫs < ǫ2,
.
Hence, with a+ d ≥ α+ δ, when
rmS
rf
≥
[
a+ d
α+ δ
]
i
+ 1, (5.9a)
it does not diminish returns to divert a further a+ d resources from females to males, i.e., (5.9a) implies the
optimal return occurs at x = p(a+ d), i.e., invest in as many males as possible and the residual 1− p(a+ d)
in females if possible. If, on the other hand,
rmS
rf
≤
[
a+ d
α+ δ
]
i
, (5.9b)
it never pays to divert a+d from females to males, so the optimal return is obtained by investing all resources
in females. Any left over resources will be less than α+ δ, whence less than a+ d, and therefore insufficient
for any male. Finally, if [
a+ d
α+ δ
]
i
+ 1 >
rmS
rf
>
[
a+ d
α+ δ
]
i
, (5.9c)
then at any given x = s(a+ d) it may or may not pay to divert a further a+ d in resources from females to
males. In this case, one must examine each possibility in (5.6).
Now suppose instead that a+ d < α+ δ. One can analyse this case by suitably interchanging the roles
of males and females. Let M′ be the function (5.2) that results from the female model parameters α, δ, rf
and F ′ the function (5.3) that results from the male model parameters a, d, rm. Then M′(x) = F(x) and
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F ′(z) =M(z). ConsiderM′(y)(1/S)+F ′(1− y). Since S is a constant, optimization of this expression wrt
y is equivalent to optimizing M′(y) + F ′(1 − y)S wrt y, i.e., equivalent to optimizing F(y) +M(1 − y)S
wrt y, which is equivalent to optimizing M(x)S + F(1 − x) wrt x = 1 − y. Hence, interchanging the roles
of males and females and inverting the sex ratio yields a problem that is equivalent to the original model.
Thus, one solves the transformed model as in the previous paragraph; if the solution is to apply resources y
to ‘males’ represented by M′, then the actual optimal solution is to apply resources y to actual females.
For a direct approach to the case when a+ d < α+ δ, the question is whether it pays, at x = s(a+ d),
to divert a further a + d in resources from females to another male. The gain from the additional male is
rmS. Again write 1− s(a+ d) = ℓs(α+ δ)+ ǫs. Since a+ d < α+ δ, there is no loss in return from females if
a+ d ≤ ǫs and a loss of rf if a+ d > ǫs (one loses at most one female in this case to gain a+ d for a male).
In the latter case, the net change is rmS− rf . Whether the latter case occurs depends on ǫs, which depends
on the model parameters. In any case, one can assert that if
a+ d < α+ δ and
rmS
rf
≥ 1 (5.10a)
then it does not diminish returns R2 to divert further resources from females to males, whence the optimal
return is obtained by investing in as many males as possible (the residue is too small to invest in a female).
On the other hand, if
a+ d < α+ δ and
rmS
rf
< 1 (5.10b)
then it will not pay to divert a + d to another male if doing so reduces the number of females invested in
(by one). In this case, one can only say the optimal return occurs at some point of (5.6); computation will
determine which.
Observe that if one solves this scenario using the symmetry argument, then (5.9b) asserts that if
rf/rmS < [(α+δ)/(a+d)]i then the optimal strategy is to invest in all “females”, i.e., in actual males. Since
a+ d < α + δ, then [(α + δ)/(a+ d)]i ≥ 1. Thus, (5.10a) is consistent with (5.9b). If (5.10b) holds, any of
(5.9a–c) may in principle hold.
Note that the conditions (5.9–10) only involve the ratio of rmS to rf and the ratio of a+ d to α+ δ.
It is a simple matter to compute R2 for specified values of x, in particular the values (5.6), with the
model parameters as variables (for example in MS Excel) so that one can easily numerically solve the model
and generate examples confirming (5.9–10). For example, with α = 0.05, δ = 0.1, a = 0.2, d = 0.05, rf = 1,
rm = 1.5, S = 1, then 1 < (a + d)(α + δ) and [(a+ d)(α + δ)]i < rm/rf < [(a + d)(α + δ)]i + 1. Consistent
with (5.9c), one finds the optimal strategy occurs at x = 0.25, i.e., s = 1 in (5.6), so a mixed strategy of
investing in 1 male and 5 females yields the optimal return for the given model parameters.
Now consider Model 1 under the assumption (a + d) + (α + δ) ≤ 1; equivalently, a + d ≤ 1 − α − δ.
Then, R1(x) is obtained by maximizing
rmn
φ+ k
µ+ n
+ rfk, (5.11a)
with respect to n and k subject to
0 ≤ n ≤
[
x
a+ d
]
i
0 ≤ k ≤
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
, (5.11b)
but where n = 0 only on [0, a+ d) and k = 0 only on (1− (α+ δ), 1]. As a function of n, the first summand
is increasing and so is maximal for n = [x/(a+ d)]i. With this choice, (5.11a) is also an increasing function
of k, whence maximal for k = [(1 − x)/(α+ δ)]i. Hence,
R1(x) =M(x)Sx + F(1− x) = R3(x), (5.12)
i.e., (4.1) reduces to (4.3); Model 1 reduces to Model 3.
So consider Model 3. Recalling (5.5), on a subinterval
[
s(a + d), (s + 1)(a + d)
)
, s = 0, . . . , p − 1 or[
p(a+ d), 1
]
, since
R3(x) = rm
[
x
a+ d
]
i

φ+
[
1−x
α+δ
]
i
µ+
[
x
a+d
]
i

+ rf
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
,
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then as [(1 − x)/(α + δ)]i is nonincreasing and [x/(a+ d)]i is constant, then M(x) is constant, F(1 − x) is
nonincreasing, and Sx is also nonincreasing (the denominator is constant and the numerator nonincreasing).
Hence, R3(x) takes its maximum value on each of these subintervals at the initial point of the subinterval
(though not necessarily uniquely). Hence, as for R2, one can find an optimal strategy from amongst the
possibilities (5.6). This observation limits the numerical analysis required. Note, however, that the gain in
diverting a+ d from females to another male is offset not only by the loss of the return from the females but
also by the decrease in Sx through the numerator, so that (5.9) is not valid for Model 1.
Suppose α = 0.05, δ = 0.05, a = 0.2, d = 0.025, rm = 4, rf = 1, φ = 10, µ = 5 (whence S = 2). Then
(a + d)/(α + δ) > 1, Srm/rf = 8 > [(a + d)/(α + δ)]i + 1 = 3, so in Model 2 (5.9a) predicts the optimal
strategy would be to invest in as many males as possible. Indeed, for Model 2, x = 0.9, i.e., s = 4 in (5.6),
is the optimal strategy, investing in 4 males and 1 female for a return of 33. For Model 1, however, one
computes that the optimal return is 22.5 and can be achieved with s = 3 in (5.6) to give x = 0.675, i.e., by
investing in 3 males and 3 females. In Model 1, the strategy x = 0.9 yields a return of 20.5.
6. STEP-FUNCTION FEMALES ANDNON-STEP-FUNCTION
MALES
In this section I assume the individual female return function is as in (5.1) while the individual male
return function is assumed to be a nondecreasing function (other than a step function) with a packaging
cost of d. I restrict attention to the case for which d + (α + δ) < 1, equivalently d < 1 − (α + δ), so that
investment in both genders is possible. For Model 2, one therefore has (4.2) with F(z) as in (5.3). Write
1 = n(α+ δ) + ǫ, n a nonnegative integer, 0 ≤ ǫ < α+ δ (6.1)
and choose the nonnegative integer k so that
w := 1− k(α+ δ) > d but 1− (k + 1)(α+ δ) ≤ d, (6.2)
i.e., subtracting increments of α+δ from 1, w is the last quantity so obtained that is greater than d. Observe
that, on each of the subintervals
(
1− (α + δ), 1], (1− 2(α+ δ), 1− (α + δ)], ..., (d, 1− k(α+ δ)], (6.3)
the function F(1− x) is constant, given by its value at the right-hand endpoint.
6.4 Lemma
Whenever m(x) is a nondecreasing function of x, so is M(x).
Proof: For resources y > x, one can of course obtain the return M(x) with investment of resources
x, leaving y − x further to invest, so one can do no worse than M(x), i.e., M(y) ≥ M(x). For m as in
(3.d) or (3.e), for example, this result is explicitly of the form: M(y) = nym(y/ny), which is at least as
large as nxm(y/nx) since ny is by definition the optimal equitable division of resources y; but since m is
nondecreasing, nxm(y/nx) ≥ nxm(x/nx) =M(x).
It follows from (6.4) and the constancy of F(1 − x) on each of the subintervals of (6.3) that R2(x) is
nondecreasing on each of these subintervals, whence its maximal value on each subinterval of (6.3) occurs
at the right-hand endpoint. Moreover, since R2(x) = F (1 − x) on [0, d], then R2(x) is nonincreasing on
[0,d]. Thus, the optimal return in Model 2, whenever females have step-function return, occurs at one of the
points:
1, 1− (α+ δ), 1− 2(α+ δ), . . . , 1− k(α+ δ) = w, 0. (6.5)
For Model 2, it therefore suffices to compute the return R2 for this finite list of possibilities and select the
maximum value to determine the optimal return.
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Now consider Model 1. From (4.1) and (5.1), it is clear that the optimal strategy requires investment
of 1− x in k1−x := [(1 − x)/(α+ δ)]i females so that R1 takes the form
R1(x) = P (x, nx)(φ+ k1−x) + rfk1−x, (6.6)
where P (x, n) := nm(x/n)/(µ + n) and nx is the nonnegative integer maximizing P (x, n) subject to (A.2)
(nx = 1 for 3.b–c). Hence, if y > x, because P (y, ny) ≥ P (y, n) for any n satisfying (A.2),
P (y, ny) :=
nym(y/ny)
µ+ ny
≥ nxm(y/nx)
µ+ nx
≥ nxm(x/nx)
µ+ nx
= P (x, nx).
Thus, P (x, nx) is a nondecreasing function of x and the remaining terms of (6.6) are constant on the
subintervals (6.3), so R1(x) is nondecreasing on these subintervals and thus takes its maximal value on each
subinterval at the right-hand endpoint. As R1(x) = F(1 − x) on [0, d], then as with Model 2, it suffices to
compute the return R1 for the finite list of possibilities (6.5) and select the maximum value to determine
the optimal return.
I present details of specific cases in the following subsections.
6.a Linear Males
The individual return function for males is given by (3.b.1). As usual, I suppose d + (α + δ) < 1,
equivalently, d < 1− α− δ, in order that investment in both genders is possible.
For Model 2, one has
R2(x) =


rf
[
(1−x)
α+δ
]
i
, if x ∈ [0, d];
a(x− d)S + rf
[
1−x
α+δ
]
i
, if x ∈ [d, 1].
(6.a.1)
I will derive a complete characterization of the optimal strategy in terms of the model parameters.
Assume that
a(α+ δ)S > rf , (6.a.2)
i.e., the marginal return on investing α+δ in a male (beyond the initial investment of d) exceeds the marginal
return from investment of the same resources in a single female. Then,
R2(1) > R2(1− α− δ) > · · · > R2
(
1− (k − 1)(α+ δ)) > R2(w) (6.a.3)
since each term is the previous term plus −a(α+ δ)S + rf . Thus, granted (6.a.2), (6.5) implies that R2 has
its maximum value on (d, 1] at x = 1. It then follows from (6.5) that the larger of R2(1) and R2(0) is the
maximum value of R2.
If, on the other hand,
a(α+ δ)SP < rf , (6.a.4)
then
R2(1) < R2(1− α− δ) < · · · < R2
(
1− (k − 1)(α+ δ)) < R2(w), (6.a.5)
whence from (6.5) the maximum value of R2 on (d, 1] occurs at x = w. Hence, by (6.5), the maximum value
of R2 occurs at x = w or x = 0 (the return on investing α+ δ in another female is greater than the marginal
return on the same investment in a male, so the optimal strategy is to invest in as many females as possible,
either exclusively females or the maximum number with enough left over to invest in a male with return).
Clearly, if R2(0) ≤ R2(1), then as R2(1) < R2(w), then the optimal strategy occurs at x = w.
To determine the optimal strategy, otherwise, i.e., when (6.a.4) holds and R2(0) > R2(1), recall (6.1),
and suppose first that d < ǫ, whence the k of (6.2) equals n and w = ǫ. In fact, irrespective of the relative
magnitudes of R2(0) and R2(1), when d < ǫ,
R2(0) = rfn < rfn+ a(ǫ− d)S = R2(ǫ) = R2(w),
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i.e., x = 0 is not optimal.
Finally, suppose instead that d ≥ ǫ, whence the k in (6.2) is less than n. Now, using (6.1),
R2(w) = rfk + a
(
1− k(α+ δ)− d)S
= rfk + a(1− d)S − ak(α+ δ)S
≤ rfk + a(1− ǫ)S − ak(α+ δ)S
= rfk + an(α+ δ)S − ak(α+ δ)S by (6.1)
= rfk + a(n− k)(α + δ)S
< rfk + (n− k)rf by (6.a.4)
= rfn = R2(0).
In summary, the optimal return must occur at x = 1, x = 0, or the interior solution w given by (6.2),
and these possibilities occur as follows:
R2(1) > R2(0) & aS(α+ δ) ≥ rf then x = 1
(if R2(1) = R2(0), then x = 0 and x = 1 give the same return);
R2(0) > R2(1) & aS(α+ δ) ≥ rf then x = 0;
R2(1) ≥ R2(0) & aS(α+ δ) < rf then x = w; (6.a.6)
R2(0) > R2(1) & aS(α+ δ) < rf &
{
d < ǫ, then x = w;
d ≥ ǫ, then x = 0.
Each of these scenarios is realizable with appropriate choices of model parameters.
Now consider Model 1. Investing in more than a single male decreases the return from males both
through packaging costs (as in 3.b) and through the weighting factor SP . Hence, Model 1 reduces to Model
3 and (6.6) becomes
R1(x) =


rf
[
1−x
α+δ
]
i
, if x ∈ [0, d];
a(x− d)
(
φ+[ 1−xα+δ ]i
µ+1
)
+ rf
[
1−x
α+δ
]
i
, if x ∈ [d, 1];
(6.a.7)
which is in fact continuous at x = d.
The optimal return must occur at one of (6.5) but the varying value of SP now complicates matters.
One has:
R1(1) = a(1− d) φ
µ+ 1
;
R1
(
1− (α + δ)) = rf + a(1− (α+ δ)− d)φ+ 1
µ+ 1
=
[
a(1− d)φ + 1
µ+ 1
]
+
[
rf − a(α+ δ)φ+ 1
µ+ 1
]
;
R1
(
1−2(α+δ)) = 2rf+a(1−2(α+δ)−d)φ+ 2
µ+ 1
=
[
rf + a
(
1− (α+ δ)− d)φ+ 2
µ+ 1
]
+
[
rf − a(α+ δ)φ + 2
µ+ 1
]
;
... (6.a.7)
R1(w) = R1
(
1− k(α+ δ)) = krf + a(1− k(α+ δ)− d)φ+ k
µ+ 1
=
[
(k − 1)rf + a
(
1− (k − 1)(α+ δ)− d)φ+ k
µ+ 1
]
+
[
rf − a(α+ δ)φ+ k
µ+ 1
]
;
R1(0) = rfn.
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For r = 1, . . . , k, consider the final expression for R1
(
1−r(α+δ)). The first bracketed quantity is larger than
R1
(
1− (r − 1)(α+ δ)). The second summand can be either positive or negative. Thus, depending on these
values, it seems likely that the optimal return could occur at any one of (6.5), yielding a more complicated
situation than for R2.
Consider two possible simplifications. Suppose
rf > a(α+ δ)
φ+ k
µ+ 1
> a(α+ δ)
φ + (k − 1)
µ+ 1
> · · · > a(α+ δ)φ + 1
µ+ 1
, (6.a.8)
noting that the only assumption here is the first inequality. Then from (6.a.7) one sees that
R1(w) > R1
(
1− (k − 1)(α+ δ)) > · · · > R1(1− (α+ δ)) > R1(1), (6.a.9)
whence the maximum of R1 on (d, 1] occurs at x = w. It follows that the maximum of R1 occurs at x = w or
x = 0 if (6.a.8) holds. This result is an analogue of the results obtained above for R2 under the assumption
that rf > a(α+ δ)S.
If on the other hand
rf < a(α+ δ)
φ + 1
µ+ 1
< a(α+ δ)
φ + 2
µ+ 1
< · · · < a(α+ δ)φ+ k
µ+ 1
, (6.a.9)
where again only the first inequality is an assumption, the second summand in each line of (6.a.7) is now
negative, but whether sufficiently negative to make R1
(
1 − r(α + δ)) smaller than R1(1 − (r − 1)(α + δ))
is undetermined, which reinforces the possibility that any of (6.5) might give the optimal return, depending
on the values the model parameters take.
In any event, one need only examine the possibilities in (6.5) to find the optimal strategy.
Consider α = 0.05, δ = 0.05, rf = 1.5, a = 10, d = 0.05, S = 3 whence (6.a.6) is satisfied. With
SP = 30/10 there is no difference between Model 2 and 1 as regards optimal strategy: choose x = 1, i.e.,
invest all resources in a single male. But, in Model 1, putting SP = 6/2, which involves no change for Model
2, the optimal strategy for Model 1 is now: choose x = 0.6 = 1 − 4(α + δ), which gives a return of 24.3, by
investing only 60% of resources in the male and the remaining 40% equitably amongst 4 females, versus a
return of 19 for x = 1. Moreover, x = 0.6 is not a possible optimal strategy for Model 2 at all (w = 0.1).
This example underscores the difference between Models 1 and 2.
6.b DMR Males
With f as in (5.1) and m as in (3.d.1), one can write for Model 2
R2(x) = nxm
(
x
nx
)
S + rf
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
, (6.b.1)
where, as usual, nx is the optimal number of males in which to invest resources x, with nx = 0 understood
for x ∈ [0, d] so the first term reduces to zero on [0, d]. Assume that d+α+ δ < 1 so that investment in both
genders is possible.
Suppose m is known explicitly. If one can solve (3.d.7) explicity for t, nx can be determined from (3.d.8);
otherwise, one can approximate t with sufficient accuracy for numerical computations. For certain return
functions, one can compute M from the observations in Appendix B. Alternatively, one can compute the
quantity nm(x/n) for the allowed values (A.2) of n and determine nx by inspection. Thus, for an explicit
m, one can computeM, and then R2, at each of the values in (6.5) and numerically determine the optimal
return in Model 2. Can one say more?
If one employs the approximation
nx =
x
t
, (6.b.2)
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with t the solution of (3.d.7), then in effect the male return function becomes piecewise-linear and one obtains
an analytic expression for the resulting approximation to R2:
Ra2(x) :=


rf
[
z
α+δ
]
i
, if x ∈ [0, d];
(xm(t)/t)S + rf
[
z
α+δ
]
i
, if x ∈ (d, 1].
(6.b.3)
This expression is of the formMa(x)S + F(1− x) with
Ma(x) :=
{
0, if x ∈ [0, d];
xm(t)/t = xm′(t), if x ∈ (d, 1]; (6.b.4)
noting (3.d.7). Thus, (6.b.3) differs only from the form of (6.a.1) in that Ma(x) ∝ x rather than (x − d),
which makes Ma discontinuous at x = d (note that the packaging costs d have the effect of making the
approximation for male returns piecewise linear). Working through the argument of §6.a as applied to
(6.b.3), one obtains a modified version of (6.a.6):
Ra2(1) > R
a
2(0) & m
′(t)(α + δ)S ≥ rf then x = 1
(if Ra2(1) = R
a
2(0), then x = 0 and x = 1 give the same return);
Ra2(1) ≥ Ra2(0) & m′(t)(α + δ)S < rf then x = w; (6.b.5)
Ra2(0) > R
a
2(1) & m
′(t)(α+ δ)S < rf &
{
d < ǫ, then x = w;
d ≥ ǫ, then x = 0 or w.
BecauseRa2(1) = m
′(t)S while Ra2(0) = rf [1/(α+ δ)]i ≤ rf/(α+δ), rf ≤ m′(t)(α+δ)S entailsRa2(0) ≤ Ra2(1)
and the second possibility in (6.a.6) will not in fact occur here. But, while
m′(t)S ≥ rf
α+ δ
≥ rf (1 − ǫ)
α+ δ
= R2(0)
m′(t)S ≥ R2(1) so in the actual model R2(1) < R2(0) may not be ruled out when m′(t)(α + δ)S ≥ rf .
Moreover, in place of (6.a.4), one only finds Ra2(w) < R
a
2(0) +m
′(t)Sǫ, so the final case in (6.a.6), is here
left unresolved, the condition d ≥ ǫ being uninformative; one must simply compute the two possibilities.
Note that this approximation, if useful at all, is useful for obtaining the value of x for which R1 or R2 is
maximized. The optimal strategy must still be interpreted as equitable partition of resources x in nx males,
with nx given by (3.d.8) (and equitable partition of 1− x in females of course). If the optimal return occurs
in this approximation at x = 1, then of course nx = [1/t]i.
How useful is the approximation (6.b.2) and its consequence (6.b.5)? The error in (6.b.2) is less than
one, i.e., |nx−x/t| < 1. Since vx := x/t is the actual value at which χx(v) = vm(x/v) achieves its maximum
(§3.d), then the approximation (6.b.2) overestimates the actual return on the investment in males. The error
will therefore be magnified by S > 1 and diminished by S < 1. Thus, when (6.b.5) favours investment in
females over males, that deduction should be robust. When (6.b.5) favours investment in males over females,
that deduction may be questionable if the overestimation of male returns is significant.
In various trials with m = g as in (3.d.10) (especially with s = 1 for which χx(v) is quadratic) the linear
approximation (6.b.2–5) successfully predicted the optimal strategy. But, with d = 0.07, K = 5 and s = 1
in (3.d.10) and with δ = 0.04, α = 0.03, and rf = 1.4 in (5.1), then m
′(t)(α + δ)S < rf and R
a
2(1) < R
a
2(0)
so (6.b.5) implies the optimal return occurs at x = w = 0.02 or x = 0. In fact, Ra2 has its maximum
value of 19.81 at x = w (though Ra2(0) = 19.6, only slightly less) while R2(w) = 19.31 which is less than
R2(0) = 19.6, the actual maximal return being R2(0.16) = 19.61. So, in this case, the approximation is
slightly misleading. Note that 0.16 = 1 − 12(α + δ), so this result is consistent with (6.5). It may well be
that the difference in returns between the strategy suggested by (6.b.5) and the true optimal strategy, as in
the example just presented, is of no practical significance. For an explicit choice of function for m, one can
compute the error involved in utilizing Ra2 , but since the optimal return for R2 can be obtained readily from
(6.5) the approximation (6.b.2–5) is mostly of theoretical interest in suggesting that Model 2 with DMR
males behaves similarly to Model 2 with linear males.
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Now consider Model 1. Since for a fixed number of males invested in, the optimal partition of resources
is equitable distribution, for any x ∈ [0, 1], the expression to be optimized to obtain R1 is
nm(x/n)
(
φ+ k
µ+ n
)
+ rfk 0 ≤ n < x
d
, 0 ≤ k ≤
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
, (6.b.6)
where n = 0 on, and only on, [0, d] and k = 0 on, and only on, (1 − α − δ, 1]. It is clear that k should take
its maximal value. On (d, 1], therefore, (6.b.6) becomes
nm(x/n)

φ+
[
1−x
α+δ
]
i
µ+ n

+ rf
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
0 ≤ n < x
d
, (6.b.7)
in agreement with (6.6), and where for x ∈ [0, d] it is understood that the first summand vanishes.
The final optimization required to obtain R1 is with respect to n. Analogous to the procedure employed
to obtain nx in §3.4, for x ∈ (d, 1], consider the function
ψx(v) := vm(x/v)
(
kx
µ+ v
)
, (6.b.8)
defined on the interval (0, x/d), where kx = φ+ [(1− x)/(α+ δ)]i. We aim to find the maximal value of ψv
as a function of v for each x ∈ (d, 1] and deduce therefrom the optimal nx. By direct calculation, and after
some simplification:
ψ′x(v) =
kx
µ+ v
[
m
(x
v
) µ
µ+ v
−m′
(x
v
)(x
v
)]
; (6.b.9)
ψ′′x(v) =
−2kx
(µ+ v)2
ψ′x(v) +
kx
µ+ v
m′′
(x
v
) x2
v3
; (6.b.10)
which is not as simple as was obtained for φx in §3.4. First note that ψ′x is zero when
m
(x
v
) µ
µ+ v
= m′
(x
v
)(x
v
)
. (6.b.11)
If vx is a solution of this equation, with τx := x/vx, then (6.b.11) becomes
m(τx)
τx
µ
µ+ x/τx
= m′(τx). (6.b.12)
Interpreting this equation geometrically, since µ/(µ + x/τx) < 1, τx is a point where the line through the
origin and the point (τx,m(τx)) is steeper than the tangent line to m through the same point. From the
shape of m, it is then clear that τx > t. From (6.b.10), ψ
′′
x(vx) < 0 since m
′′(τx) < 0, i.e., each stationary
point of ψx is indeed a relative maximum. Observe, from (6.b.10), that ψ
′′
x(v) is negative wherever ψ
′
x(v) > 0,
but that when ψ′x(v) < 0, ψ
′′
x(v) may become positive. In particular, assuming ψx is C
2, as v increases away
from vx one expects ψ
′′
x may eventually change sign. But since there are no relative minima, a change in
concavity cannot result in ψx exceeding ψx(vx) whence there can only be the one relative maximum. At
v = x/d observe that (6.b.8) vanishes, whence, using (6.b.8–10), ψx can be extended to (0, x/d] in a C
2
fashion. Since one is only interested in the restriction of ψx to [1, x/d], on which ψx is bounded and positive,
and ψx has a unique relative maximum on (0, x/d) and no other critical points, its maximum on [1, x/d]
must be at vx, whence nx must be one of the integers either side of (the unique solution to (6.b.11)) vx.
Thus, one does obtain a result analogous to (3.d.8).
But, we do not have an explicit characterization of τx, only the implicit characterization of (6.b.12) and
we do not know the dependence of τx upon x. To explore these issues, rewrite (6.b.12) in the form
m(τx)−m′(τx)τx
m′(τx)
=
x
µ
. (6.b.13)
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When µ ≫ 1, the right-hand side is approximately zero, whence the numerator of the left-hand side is
approximately zero, i.e., τx ≈ t. Note that x/µ is a simple linear increasing function of x. The expression
(m(z)−m′(z)z)/m′(z), as a function of z, has derivative −mm′′/(m′)2, which is indeed positive. Thus, as
x increases, the left-hand side of (6.b.13) must increase, and since its a strictly increasing function of τx, it
must be the case that τx increases with x. Since τx > t, then as x increases, m
′(τx) decreases more rapidly
than m(τx)/τx. It follows from (6.b.12), that vx = x/τx increases with x.
In summary, one finds
R1(x) = nxm(x/nx)

φ+
[
1−x
α+δ
]
i
µ+ nx

 + rf
[
1− x
α+ δ
]
i
, (6.b.14)
where, for x ∈ (d, 1], nx is the integer either side of vx = x/τx that maximizes the first summand in (6.b.13),
while nx = 0 for x ∈ [0, d]. We have seen that τx > t and that both τx and vx are increasing functions of
x. Since τx > t, then vx := x/τx < x/t, i.e., not surprisingly, in Model 1, vx, whence possibly nx, is smaller
than in Model 2, since the value of males is discounted by their own numbers. Note that Model 1 has not
reduced to Model 3. In any event, one computes R1 for each of the possibilities in (6.5) to determine the
optimal return; for each such x, if necessary, one can compute nm(x/n)/(µ+n) for the allowed values (A.2)
of n and thereby determine nx, thence R1(x).
Turning to the explicit examples of (3.d.10), for h one finds that (6.b.13) becomes [(1−s)τx−d]/s = x/µ,
i.e.,
τx =
sx+ dµ
µ(1 − s) = t+
sx
µ(1− s) . (6.b.15)
As expected, τx is an increasing function of x and for µ≫ 1, τx ≈ t. Furthermore,
vx =
x
τx
=
xµ(1 − s)
sx+ dµ
, (6.b.16)
which is an increasing function of x with horizontal asymptote at y = µ(1 − s)/s. But x = 1 is the upper
limit for our interests, hence vx ≤ µ(1− s)/(s+ dµ). Thus, for h, one has a fairly simple situation.
Now consider g. For (6.b13), one obtains
τs+1x − (s+ 1)dsτx
sds
=
x
µ
. (6.b.17)
which can be rewritten as the polynomial equation
p(z) := zs+1 − (s+ 1)dsz − (x/µ)sds = 0. (6.b.18)
Observe that
p(t) = p( s
√
s+ 1d) = (s+ 1) s
√
s+ 1ds+1 − (s+ 1) s√s+ 1ds+1 − (x/µ)sds = −x
µ
sds < 0.
By Descartes’s rule of signs, (6.b.18) has at most one real positive root. Since p is positive for large z and
negative at z = t, then p has exactly one positive real root, somewhere on (t,∞). Also note,
p(1) = 1− (s+ 1)ds − x
µ
sds < 1.
So, if p(1) > 0, then t < τx ≤ 1. Otherwise, τx ≥ 1, in which case, as in (3.d.9), nx = 1.
Now τ (I drop the subscript for convenience) satisfies (6.b.18). Differentiating this equation implicitly
with respect to x, one finds
τ ′ =
s
s+ 1
ds
µ
1
τs − ds , (6.b.19)
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and as τ > d then τs > ds so τ ′ is positive, confirming τ is an increasing function of x. As vx = x/τ ,
differentiating with respect to x yields,
v′x =
τ − xτ ′
τ2
. (6.b.20)
Substituting (6.b.19) into (6.b.20), the numerator is
τ − xτ ′ = (s+ 1)τ
s+1 − (s+ 1)dsτ − sxds/µ
(s+ 1)(τs − ds) =
sτs+1
(s+ 1)(τs − ds)
since τ satisfies (6.b.18). As τs − ds > 0, it follows that
v′x =
sτs−1
(s+ 1)(τs − ds) > 0 (6.b.21)
confirming that vx is an increasing function of x. In general, it does not appear possible to give an explicit
formula for the positive real root of (6.b.18), i.e., a formula for τ as a function of x.
Consider the particular case s = 1, however. Then (6.b.18) is the quadratic
z2 − 2dz − xd/µ = 0
with solutions d±
√
d2 + xd/µ. The choice of minus sign clearly gives a negative number so
τx = d+
√
d2 + dx/µ = t+
√
d2 + dx/µ− d, (6.b.22)
since t = 2d when s = 1. Again, τx ≈ t when µ≫ 1. Furthermore,
vx =
x
d+
√
d2 + xd/µ
, (6.b.23)
and one computes
v′x =
d
√
d2 + dx/µ+ d2 + xd2µ
(d+
√
d2 + dx/µ)2
√
d2 + dx/µ
> 0,
confirming that vx is an increasing function of x when s = 1.
As an example, for m = g with d = 0.07, K = 5.25, s = 1, and with α = δ = 0.05, rf = 1.5,
and S = 10/10, Model 2 has an optimal return of 18.7 for the strategy x = 1 with equitable partition of all
resources amongst 7 males, while Model 1 has an optimal return of 18.4 for the strategy x = 0.3 = 1−7(α+δ)
by investing 30% of resources equitably between 2 males and 70% equitably amongst 7 females. The return
in Model 1 from the strategy x = 1 is only 11.4.
6.c Sigmoid Males
The theoretical discussion for this case is essentially identical to that for DMR males. Note that the
consideration of ψx is really only relevant when x > p (since nx = 1 for x ∈ (d, p]) where m′′ < 0 as for DMR
return functions. Thus, Models 2 & 1 may be solved as indicated in §6.b.
The linear approximation to Model 2, however, is another matter. Recall from §3.e that for sigmoid
malesM(x) = m(x), on [0, p]. The linear approximation ofM byMa(x) = (x/t)m(t) cannot be expected to
provide a good approximation to m on [0, p]. The larger is p, the more pronounced will be the disagreement
between M andMa. Of course, the smaller is p the more a sigmoid approximates to a DMR function.
For case studies of sigmoid return functions, I employed a sigmoid return function based on the logistic.
Consider, for x ≥ d,
l(x) :=
ZL
(L− Z)e−r(x−d) + Z − Z, (6.c.1)
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with L > Z > 0, then l(x) → L−Z as x→∞ and l(d) = 0. The point p of inflexion of l is found to satisfy
r =
ln
(
L−Z
Z
)
p− d . (6.c.2)
Through this equation, L, Z, d and p can be taken to be the model parameters (specifying p provides more
direct control of whether the sigmoid is more like an IMR or DMR return function, or balanced between
these two extremes). Substituting (6.c.2) into (6.c.1) yields
l(x) =
ZL
(L− Z)
(
Z
L−Z
)x−d
p−d
+ Z
− Z. (6.c.3)
One may compute that
l′(p) =
rL
4
=
L ln
(
L−Z
Z
)
4(p− d) , (6.c.4)
for the maximum rate of change of l, and
l′(d) =
r(L − Z)Z
L
=
ln
(
L−Z
Z
) (
L−Z
L
)
Z
p− d . (6.c.5)
For l to display its asymptotic behaviour on the interval (d, 1], one requires r large, which can be achieved
by choosing Z small relative to p− d.
Substituting (6.c.1) into (3.4.7) yields
rLter(t−d) = Ze2r(t−d) + (L − 2Z)er(t−d) − (L − Z),
which is not analytically solvable for t, though one can numerically approximate t for given parameters by
plotting m′(x)x −m(x) as a function of x to locate the zero. Thus, the optimal n for any x will have to be
determined numerically, either by computing nm(x/n) for the allowed values (A.2) of n or by numerically
approximating t and using (3.d.8).
For this return function, the linear approximation to M was indeed poor on [0, p]. Examination of the
function φx for (6.c.1) indicates it is much more peaked than for g and h (and does become concave up
towards the right-hand end of its domain) so the approximation of taking nx to be vx = x/t is less accurate.
The difference between sigmoid and DMR males is most pronounced, of course, when p is a significant
fraction of the available resources. With L = 10 , Z = 0.01, d = 0.05, p = 0.45, α = δ = 0.05, rf = 1.5 then
w = 0.1. With S = 1, Model 2 has an optimal return at x = 0.6 = 1− 4(α+ δ) (this value indicates the poor
performance of the linear approximation) achieved by investing 60% of resources in a single male and the
remaining 40% equitably amongst 4 females. Model 1 achieves its optimal return with the same strategy,
independently of the values of φ and µ (subject to φ/µ = 1). If S = 4, the optimal strategy becomes x = 1
for Model 2 and for Model 1 with large populations. When µ = 6 and φ = 24, the optimal strategy for Model
1 switches to x = 0.6 again (investing in one male as before), and remains so for smaller values of µ. This
relative stability of the optimal strategy in Model 1 relative to the value of µ in a fixed ratio φ/µ reflects
the fact that one must invest more than p in each male to obtain a useful return and here p is a substantial
proportion of the available resources, thus severely limiting the number of males one can invest in.
7. STEP-FUNCTION MALES AND NON-STEP-FUNCTION
FEMALES
The male return function m is given by (3.a.1), whence M is given by (3.a.2). The packaging cost for
females is δ; assume that a + d + δ < 1, equivalently a + d < 1 − δ, so that investment in both genders is
possible.
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Results for Model 2 can be obtained from the results for Model 2 in §5.2 as follows. One has
R2(x) =M(x)S + F(1 − x) = nxrmS + F(1 − x),
where nx = [x/(a+ d)]i. Substitute z = 1− x and multiply by 1/S to obtain
Rˆ2(z) = F(z)Sˆ + kzrm, (7.1)
where Sˆ := 1/S and kz = nx = [(1 − z)/(a + d)]i. By interchanging the roles of males and females, the
optimal strategy for (5.3.1) can be obtained from the appropriate case in §5.2. In particular, with
1 = ν(a+ d) + ǫ ν a nonnegative integer 0 ≤ ǫ < a+ d, (7.2)
and choose ℓ so that ω := ℓ(a+ d) < 1− δ but (ℓ+1)(a+ d) ≥ 1− δ, analogous to (6.1–2). Then the optimal
return for Rˆ2, whence for R2, must occur at one of
0, a+ d, 2(a+ d), . . . , ℓ(a+ d) = ω, 1. (7.3)
For example, by this procedure one obtains the analogue of (6.a.6) for Model 2 with step-function males and
linear females
f(z) = β(z − δ); (7.4)
namely, the optimal strategy occurs at the x value X = 0, 1− ω, or 1 according as:
R2(0) ≥ R2(1) & β(a+ d) ≥ Srm, then X = 0;
R2(1) > R2(0) & β(a+ d) ≥ Srm, then X = 1;
R2(0) ≥ R2(1) & β(a+ d) < Srm, then X = 1− ω; (5.3.5)
R2(1) ≥ R2(0) & β(a+ d) < Srm, &
{
δ < ǫ, then X = 1− ω;
δ ≥ ǫ, then X = 1,
where ǫ is as in (7.2).
Due to the asymmetry between males and females in Model 1, however, interchanging the roles of males
and females does not convert the current cases into those of §6. Since, for the return functions of §3, optimal
investment always requires equitbale partition of resources amongst several individuals of the same gender,
R1 can be obtained by maximizing
nrm
µ+ n
(φ+ k) + kf
(
1− x
k
)
,
with respect to n and k. As n/(µ+ n) is an increasing function of n, one gets
nxrm
µ+ nx
(φ+ k) + kf
(
1− x
k
)
, (7.6)
where nx = [x/(a+ d)]i and
R1(x) =
nxrm
µ+ nx
(φ+ k1−x) + k1−xf
(
1− x
k1−x
)
, (7.7)
where k1−x optimizes (7.6). Now, Cx := nxrm/(µ+ nx) is constant on subintervals of the form
[0, a+ d),
[
(a+ d), 2(a+ d)
)
, . . . ,
[
ℓ(a+ d), 1− δ) (7.8)
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where ℓ is as above. So, if x < y within one of these subintervals, then
R1(x) = Cx(φ+ k1−x) + k1−xf
(
1− x
k1−x
)
≥ Cx(φ+ k1−y) + k1−yf
(
1− x
k1−y
)
by the optimality of k1−x
≥ Cy(φ+ k1−y) + k1−yf
(
1− y
k1−y
)
since f is an increasing function
= R1(y),
i.e., R1 is nonincreasing on each subinterval of (7.8), while on [1 − δ, 1] R1 takes its maximal value at 1.
Hence, the optimal return is achieved at one of x values of (7.3) after all.
Thus, for step-function males, the optimal return for both Models 1 & 2 must occur at one of the x
values listed in (7.3) and to this extent the situation for both models is analogous to §6. While the analogy
is complete for Model 2, to underscore the difference for Model 1 between §§6 and 7, recall that for linear
males and step-function females, the optimal strategy involved investment in at most one male. Consider
now Model 1 for step-function males and linear females. With notation as above, on [1− δ, 1], R1(x) = Cxφ
while for z > δ (i.e., x < 1− δ) one must optimize
Cx(φ+ k) + β(z − kδ) = Cxφ+ (Cx − βδ)k + βz,
with respect to k, subject to k < z/δ. On [0, a+ d), Cx = 0 and the coefficient of k is negative. Whenever
the coefficient of k is negative, the optimal value of k is 1. But when the coefficient is positive, the optimal
value of k is the largest possible value subject to the constraint k < z/δ. The coefficient of k is positive
iff Cx > βδ, i.e., iff the net return from the investment in males per female in the post-release population
exceeds the total cost due to female packaging cost per translocated female. If so, then it pays to invest in
more than one linear female, whence the case of step-function males and linear females differs in this respect
from that of linear males and step-function females.
Optimization of (7.6) with DMR or Sigmoid females to obtain R1 will be considered in the more general
setting of §9.
8. LINEAR MALES AND FEMALES
Suppose that the individual return functions for males and females are both linear:
m(x) =
{
0, if x ∈ [0, d];
a(x− d), if x ∈ [d, 1]; f(z) =
{
0, if z ∈ [0, δ]
α(z − δ), if z ∈ [δ, 1]. (8.1)
From (3.b.3), M(x) = m(x) and F(z) = f(z). If d + δ ≥ 1, then one can only invest in either males or
females. The returns for Model 1 will be a(1− d)φ/(µ+ 1) and α(1 − δ) respectively.
Now suppose d+ δ < 1, i.e., d < 1− δ. Consider first Model 2. Then (4.2) is
R2(x) =


α(1− x− δ), if x ∈ [0, d];
ψ(x), if x ∈ [d, 1− δ];
a(x− d)S, if x ∈ [1− δ, 1];
(8.2)
where
ψ := a(x− d)S + α(1 − x− δ) = (aS − α)x + α(1− δ)− adS. (8.3)
Note that R2 is continuous and piecewise linear. R2 decreases linearly on [0, d], increase linearly on [1− δ, 1],
and either increases or decreases linearly (as ψ(x)) on [d, 1 − δ]. Thus, there are no local maxima on (0, 1)
and the maximum of R2 occurs at x = 0 or 1. Hence, if
R2(1) = a(1 − d)S > α(1 − δ) = R2(0), equivalently aS
α
>
1− δ
1− d , (8.4a)
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choose x = 1, i.e., assign all resources to a single male; while if
R2(1) = a(1 − d)S < α(1 − δ) = R2(0), equivalently aS
α
<
1− δ
1− d , (8.4b)
choose x = 0, i.e., assign all resources to a single female. Thus, a very simple strategy results.
Now consider Model 1. On [0, d], M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn) = 0 and when investing purely in females the
optimal strategy is to invest in a single individual, so R1(x) = R2(x) = R3(x) on [0, d]. On [1 − δ, 1],
F (z; k; z1, . . . , zk) = 0, so (4.1) reduces to M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn)SP = a(x− nd)[φ/(µ+ n)], 1 ≤ n ≤ x/d. This
expression is maximized for n = 1, so R1(x) = a(x− d)φ/(µ+ 1) = [µ/(µ+ 1)]R2(x) = R3(x) on [1− δ, 1].
On (d, 1 − δ), one must maximize the expression
a(x− nd)φ + k
µ+ n
+ α(1 − x− kδ) 0 < n < x
d
, 0k <
1− x
δ
,
noting that both n = 0 and k = 0 are non optimal. The first summand is maximized with respect to n by
choosing n = 1, yielding
a(x− d)φ + k
µ+ 1
+ α(1 − x− kδ), 1 ≤ k < 1− x
δ
, (8.5)
which is linear in k. The coefficient of k is
a(x− d)
(µ+ 1)
− αδ, (8.6)
which is an increasing linear function of x on (d, 1 − δ), initially negative and with zero at
x∗ =
α
a
δ(µ+ 1) + d > d. (8.7)
When (8.6) is negative, (8.5) is maximized by choosing k = 1. But when (8.6) is positive, (8.5) is maximized
by choosing the largest value of k subject to k < (1 − x)/δ, , i.e., the largest k satisfying x < 1 − kδ; so if
x ∈ [1− (ℓ + 1)δ, 1− ℓδ), choose k = ℓ.
For simplicity, first suppose that x∗ ≥ 1− δ, i.e.,
α
a
≥ 1− d− δ
δ(µ+ 1)
, (8.8)
in which case (8.5) is maximized by choosing k = 1 at each x ∈ (d, 1 − δ) and Model 1 reduces to Model 3.
Substituting (φ+1)/(µ+1) for S in (8.3), the result, denoted ψ3, is still linear in x. We have already noted
that R3 = R2 on [0, d] and that R3 = [µ/(µ+ 1)]R2(x) on [1 − δ, 1]. Hence, R3 is, like R2, piecewise linear
on [0, 1] and continuous at x = d. But unlike R2, R3 is discontinuous at x = 1− δ, due to the discontinuous
behaviour of SP there. When x < 1−δ, one invests 1−x in a single female and this female contributes to SP .
The limiting return for R3 as x approaches 1− δ from the left is limx→(1−δ)− R3(x) = limx→(1−δ)− ψ3(x) =
a(1 − δ − d)(φ + 1)/(µ + 1) > a(1 − δ − d)φ/(µ + 1) = R3(1 − δ), i.e., the actual return at 1 − δ is less
because one can no longer invest in the female and it drops out of the factor SP . By the same argument
as for Model 2, one deduces that there is no local maximum for R3 on (0, 1). Thus, the optimal return for
R3 = R1, granted (8.8), occurs at x = 0 or 1; unless ψ3 is increasing, in which case it is possible that the
limiting strategy limx→(1−δ)− R3(x) exceeds both x = 0 and 1. If so, there is a strategy that assigns 1−δ− ǫ
to the male and ǫ+ δ to the female which is more optimal than either x = 0 or x = 1. Decreasing ǫ increases
the overall return as long as ǫ > 0. In this case, there would be no actual optimal strategy (R3 has no
maximum value on [0, 1]), though one can achieve a return arbitrarily close to the limiting strategy (which
is the supremum, the least upper bound, of R3 on [0, 1]). This possibility arises only if ψ3 is increasing, i.e.,
a/α > (µ+ 1)/(φ+ 1), which is not at all implausible, and if the limiting strategy exceeds the strategies at
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x = 0 and 1. The limiting strategy will exceed R1(1) only when δ < (1 − d)/(1 + φ), which will fail when
the number of females in the target population is sufficiently large.
Returning now to the general scenario for Model 1, R1(x) = R3(x) on [0, x
∗) with a single female
invested in on this subinterval. At x = x∗, (8.6) is zero and k drops out of (8.5) and R1(x
∗) is independent
of the value one chooses for k. Suppose x∗ ∈ [1− (k∗ + 1)δ, 1− k∗δ). Specify k = k∗ at x∗.
For x ∈ (x∗, 1−δ), (8.6) is positive whence (8.5) is maximized by choosing k as large as possible subject to
k < (1−x)/δ. Denote this value of k by k1−x. For linear returns, one may take the partition of resources 1−x
amongst k1−x individuals as equitable partitioning. Observe that on Ik :=
[
1− (k+1)δ, 1− kδ)∩ (x∗, 1− δ),
k1−x = k and R1 is linear in x:
R1(x) = a(x− d)φ+ k1−x
µ+ 1
+ α(1 − x− k1−xδ). (8.9)
Thus, R1 is: piecewise linear on [0, 1]; continuous on [0, x
∗); but, if k∗ > 1, discontinuous at x = x∗ ,
1− k∗δ, 1− (k∗ − 1)δ, . . . , 1− δ. Note that the coefficient of x in (8.9) depends on k1−x and decreases with
increasing x. If, therefore, this coefficient is negative at x∗, then it is negative throughout [x∗, 1− δ) and R1
is piecewise linear and decreasing on this subinterval. It also follows that R1 is decreasing linear on (d, x
∗]
(since R1 is obtained on this subinterval by substituting 1 for k1−x in (8.9)). In this case, the optimal return
occurs at x = 0 or 1. If, on the other hand, the coefficient of x in (8.9) is positive on [x∗, 1− k∗δ), then R1
is linear increasing on this subinterval and either increasing or decreasing on [1− k∗δ, 1− (k∗ − 1)δ), and
so on. Once R1 becomes decreasing on one of these subintervals, it is decreasing on the remaining such
subintervals. In this case, the optimal return can only occur at
x = 0, x∗, 1− k∗δ, 1− (k∗ − 1)δ, . . . , 1− 2δ, 1 (R1(1) > R1(1− δ)). (8.10)
But as we saw in the case when x∗ > 1− δ, it may be that R1 does not, because of its discontinuities, have
a maximum value on [0, 1], but rather approaches a supremum, achieved as
lim
x→y−
R1(x), for y = 1− k∗δ, 1− (k∗ − 1)δ, . . . , 1− δ. (8.11)
In this case, one must examine the returns at x = 0, 1 and at any other point of (8.10) for which R1 is
decreasing on the subinterval that point starts, and the limiting strategy at any point of (8.11) for which
R1 is increasing on the subinterval that point terminates. The limit of R1(x) as x approaches 1− kδ is just
a(1− kδ − d)(φ + k)/(µ+ 1), which exceeds R1(1) if and only if δ < (1 − d)/(φ+ k).
With d = 0.05, a = 5, δ = 0.05, α = 1, φ = 10, µ = 5, one has R1(1) = 7.92, R1(0) = 0.95, x
∗ = 0.11, R1
is increasing on each of the relevant subintervals Ik and so one must examine the limit of R1 as x approaches
the righthand endpoint from the left. One finds that as x approaches each of 0.8 and 0.85 from the left, the
limit of R1(x) is 8.75, this value being the supremum of R1 on [0, 1] (the other limiting values are strictly
less than 8.75). In this case, there is no optimal strategy, only an optimal limiting strategy: take x close to
but less than 0.8 (with k = 4) or close to but less than 0.85 (with k = 3). In practice one can choose an x
close to either 0.8 or 0.85 that yields a return near 8.75, which is greater than the return of 7.92 at x = 1.
Whether such differences in return will prove of practical significance is another question.
9. DMR/SIGMOID MALES AND FEMALES
Finally, we suppose that males and females each have either DMR or sigmoid returns (in any combina-
tion). We may treat these returns together since by the arguments of §3.d–e the optimal strategy for investing
given resources in a gender with either kind of return is equitbale division of those resources amongst the
number of individuals characterized as in (3.d.7–8). The packaging costs are d for males and δ for females
and we suppose that d + δ < 1 so that investment in both genders is possible. The male individual return
function m is either DMR or sigmoid and therefore dtermines a number t satisfying (3.d.7). Similarly, the
individual female return function f is either DMR or sigmoid and also determines a number satisfying (3.d.7)
which we denote by T , i.e., T is the unique number satisfying f ′(T ) = f(T )/T .
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For Model 2, the overall return function R2 is given by (4.2), which can be written
R2(x) = nxm
(
x
nx
)
S + kzf
(
z
kz
)
, (9.1)
where z = 1 − x, nx is the optimal number of males in which to invest resources x equitably, kz is the
optimal number of females in which to invest resources z = 1 − x equitably, and it is understood that the
first summand vanishes on [0, d] and the second on [1 − δ, 1]. We resorted to numerical solution of this
model. For any x, one can find nx using (3.d.8) when one knows t and kz using the analogue of (3.d.8) for T .
Alternatively, one can compute nm(x/n) for each n satisfying (A.2) and select the optimal n and kf(z/k)
for each k satisfying kδ < z and select the optimal k. Repeating this process for a suitable range of x values
provides a graph of R2 from which one can determine the x value (to any desired degree of accuracy) yielding
the optimal strategy.
But, one can make the following approximations:
nx ≈ vx = x/t kz ≈ z/T, (9.2)
Substituting into (9.1) yields the following approximation to R2:
Ra2(x) =


(1− x)f ′(T ), if x ∈ [0, d];(
m′(t)S − f ′(T ))x+ f ′(T ) =: A(x), if x ∈ (d, 1 − δ);
xm′(t)S, if x ∈ [1− δ, 1].
(9.3)
Note that extending A(x) to all of [0, 1] gives the line joining the two points
(
0, Ra2(0)
)
and
(
1, Ra2(1)
)
.
Ra2 is discontinuous at x = d and 1 − δ and piecewise linear on [0, 1]: on [0, d] it decreases linearly from
Ra2(0) = A(0) to (1 − d)f ′(T ) < A(d) at x = d; on (d, 1 − δ), Ra2(x) = A(x) either increases or decreases
linearly towards A(1 − δ) > Ra2(1 − δ); on [1 − δ, 1], Ra2(x) increases linearly to Ra2(1) = A(1). It follows
that Ra2 achieves its maximal value at either x = 1 or x = 0 according as A(x) is increasing or decreasing,
respectively, i.e., Ra2 attains its maximum at
x =
{
1, if m′(t)S > f ′(T );
0, if m′(t)S < f ′(T ).
(9.4)
Thus, if the approximation (9.3) is effective, Model 2 has the simple solution (9.4), which is to invest all
resources equitably in males if m′(t)S is greater than f ′(T ), and equitably in females otherwise. Recall from
§6.b that the approximation (9.2) never underestimates the returns, so R2(x) ≤ Ra2(x).
Numerical examples using the function g of (3.d.10) suggest that the rule (9.4) is not without merit for
predicting the optimal strategy for Model 2. Further study of the approximation (9.2) may be worthwhile
for particular applications. That said, (9.4) is not perfect. With S = 1.5, d = 0.2 and m(x) = 6 (1− (d/x)),
and δ = 0.07 and f(z) = (1.5)
(
1− (δ/z)3), i.e., both m and f of the form g in (3.d.10), (9.4) predicts
that the optimal strategy occurs at x = 1. R2(1) = 10.8, but, from the graph of R2, the maximal value is
R2(0.89) = 11.02, indicating that a slightly higher return is achieved by investing some (0.11) resources in a
single female. In this example, (9.4) fails because (9.2) overestimates the return at x = 1 (Ra2(1) = 11.25)
excessively. Whether such differences in return prove of practical significance is another issue.
Now consider Model 1. Because resources must be equitably divided amongst individuals of a given sex,
see §3.d, R1 can be obtained by optimizing the expression
nm
(x
n
)(φ+ k
µ+ n
)
+ kf
(
1− x
k
)
, 0 ≤ n < x
d
0 ≤ k < 1− x
δ
, (9.5)
where it is understood that n = 0 only on [0, d] where the first summand is understood to vanish and k = 0
only on [1 − δ, 1] where it is understood the second summand vanishes.
The factor K := φ + k in the first summand of (9.5) merely scales the magnitude of this summand
and does not affect the optimization of the first summand with respect to n. The first summand in (9.5) is
therefore of the same form as in (6.b.6). Replacing (6.b.8) with
ψx(v) := vm
(x
v
)( K
µ+ v
)
,
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the analysis proceeds exactly as in §6.b with the result that ψx has a unique relative maximum on its domain
(0, x/d), which is its actual maximum, occuring at vx = x/τx, where τx solves (6.b.12). Hence, the optimal
value nx of n is the one of the two integers closest to τx yielding the greatest value of the first summand in
(5.5.2). Of course, it is always the case that nx = 0 on [0, d] and nx = 1 on (d, 2d]. After optimization with
respect to n, (9.5) becomes
bx(φ+ k) + kf
(
1− x
k
)
, (9.6)
where
bx := m
(
x
nx
)(
nx
µ+ nx
)
, (9.7)
It remains to optimize (9.6) with respect to k. On [0, d], bx is zero and (9.6) reduces to kf
(
(1 − x)/k),
which is optimized as in (3.d.7–8), with f and T taking the places of m and t respectively. For x ∈ [1− δ, 1],
k = 0 and R1(x) = bxφ. On (d, 1 − δ), to determine R1 it suffices to optimize
bxk + kf
(
1− x
k
)
, (9.8)
noting bx > 0. Define
ξx(w) := bxw + wf
(
1− x
w
)
, (9.9)
on (0, (1− x)/δ). Then,
ξ′x(w) = bx + f
(
1− x
w
)
− f ′
(
1− x
w
)(
1− x
w
)
(9.10a)
ξ′′x(w) = f
′′
(
1− x
w
)(
(1 − x)2
w3
)
. (9.10b)
Thus, ξx is concave down on its domain, and since ξx is assumed smooth, if there is a relative maximum for
ξx it is unique and also the maximum of ξx on its domain. Suppose then that ξx(wx) = 0 and define
σx :=
1− x
wx
(9.11)
so that, from (9.10a),
bx = f
′(σx)σx − f(σx) (9.12)
is the defining equation for σx. Since bx > 0, one requires f
′(σx) > f(σx)/σx, whence, from the shape of the
graph of f , σx < T , where as above T is the solution of (3.d.7) for f , i.e.,
δ < σx < T. (9.13)
Thus, wx = (1 − x)/σx > (1 − x)/T , i.e., in Model 1 one expects to invest in more females than one would
just to optimize the second summand of R1.
If f is of the form h = κ(x− δ)s in (3.d.10), (9.12) gives
bx = κ(σx − δ)s−1
(
σx(s− 1) + δ
)
, (9.14)
which is not explicitly solvable for σx. On the other hand, if f is of the form g = κ(1 − (δ/x)s) in (3.d.10),
(9.12) yields
σx =
s
√
s+ 1δ s
√
κ
bx + κ
= T s
√
κ
bx + κ
< T. (9.15)
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Thus, for functions of the form g, one obtains an explicit expression for σx. To determine the value of k
maximizing (9.8), one need only test the two integers closest to σx and choose the one yielding the largest
value of (9.8).
If therefore, m is of the form h, or g with s = 1, and f is of the form g, one can compute t, T , τx and σx
explicitly, which reduces the amount of numerical analysis required to determine R1. Whatever the forms
of m and f , however, for any value of x only finitely many numerical computations are required to compute
R1(x); specifically, for a given value of x, compute the first summand of (9.5) for the allowed values of n
and thereby determine nx, then compute (9.5), with nx substituted for n, for the allowed values of k and
thereby determine kx, the optimal value of k, whence R1(x).
Numerical studies using the DMR functions of (3.d.10) with various model parameters revealed no
obvious restrictions on the value of x yielding the optimal return. To give but one example, using the
function g of (3.d.10) for both males and females, with m(x) = 6(1− (0.1/x)) and f(z) = (1.5)(1− (0.1/z)3),
and with µ = 5, the optimal strategy occurs: at x = 1 when φ ≥ 19, with investment in 4 males; at
approximately x = 0.87 when 16 ≤ φ ≤ 18, with investment in 3 males and one female; at values of x in
the interval (0.73, 0.77) when 9 ≤ φ ≤ 15, with investment in 3 males and two females; at values of x in the
interval (0.44, 0.50) when 3 ≤ φ ≤ 8, with investment in two males and 4 females; and at values of x in the
interval (0.24, 0.28) when 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2, with investment in one male and 5 females.
I present one example which illustrates features typified by sigmoid returns. Take both male and female
returns to be sigmoid. Take Z = 0.01 in (6.c.3) for both return functions, but L = 10 and p = 0.3 for m and
L = 2 and p = 0.25 for f . Also set d = 0.05 and δ = 0.1 (packaging costs for males and females respectively).
With S = 1, model 2 has its optimal strategy at x = 1 with investment in 3 males. As x increases from
zero to one, nx increases monotonically from zero to 3, while kx decreases monotonically from 3 to zero. In
Model 1 (with φ = µ = 10 and the same model parameter values), there is no optimal strategy but rather a
limiting optimal strategy as x approaches 0.8 from the left of investing in 2 males and 2 females. Moreover,
as x increases from zero to one, nx increases monotonically from zero to two but kx no longer decreases
monotonically. Once investment in a male exceeds its p value, the return on that male apparently affects
the optimal number of females through SP in this interesting fashion.
11. DISCUSSION
In §§5–10, I have explored at some length various instances of the simple model I have proposed in §§2–
4. This mathematical study provides solutions of these scenarios, sometimes in the form of a mathematical
result and sometimes just as a numerical procedure, thereby demonstrating the model is tractable.
The biological content of the model is primarily to be found in the representation of reproductive return
of an individual as a function of investment, for each gender, with the further assumption that mS and f ,
where S is a suitable measure of mating opportunities of males in the target population, are comparable
measures. This assumption is taken over from the literature on sex allocation and parental investment
theory, e.g., Frank (1987). I have assumed that the return functions are nondecreasing functions, initially
zero to allow for packaging costs, and, with the exception of step-function returns, continuous. Under these
assumptions, it was found that optimal investment of resources in a given gender was never found to involve
unequal division of resources amongst several individuals, so that the optimal strategy always amounted to
equitable partition of resources (though for linear and IMR return functions, the optimal strategy is to invest
in a single individual). Linklater’s (2003) specific proposal of basing a model on the TW effect could be
achieved by the appropriate choice of return functions, perhaps sigmoid returns for males and DMR returns
for females in the context of unlimited resources and detailed knowledge of the return on investment of the
species in question. Limited resources and incomplete knowledge of returns may entail that other return
functions considered in this paper prove practical for modelling purposes.
The return functions studied here are mathematical idealizations of likely measures of reproductive
performance of real organisms. For mammals, say, the return functions might represent the number of
offspring of an individual of a specific gender in an idealized test population which reach sexual maturity.
How well continuous return functions serve to represent discrete returns might depend on the biology of the
species in question and the response to levels of investment. Perhaps multi-step-function returns will be
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more appropriate. One has some indication of the outcomes of the model with multi-step-function returns
to the extent that they approximate linear, DMR, or sigmoid returns. In general, however, one must resort
to numerical analysis to solve the model with multi-step-function returns, beginning with the essentially
combinatorial problem of determining the optimal division of given resources amongst a given number of
individuals of the same gender. The solution to this problem will depend on the exact nature of the multi-step
function and the optimal division of resources need not be equal division between individuals.
Practical applications require knowledge of the return functions, presumably by experimentation. For
endangered species, such would require possibly unjustifiable risks. For black rhino, translocations have not
been carried out with varying degrees of investment under experimental conditions. Rather, translocations
are typically carried out under a regime of fixed investment. It may be appropriate to model such translo-
cations by step-function males and females. Survival and fecundity estimates of post-release animals could
be converted into, say, mean number of offspring/per year (where for males this mean must include inverse
weighting by its mating opportunities), and this measure employed as rm for males and rf for females in the
modelling performed in §5 for application to future translocations under the same investment regime. Even
such a rudimentary model may be difficult to parametrize however; male fecundity for back rhino is unlikely
to be well known since paternity of offspring is rarely known.
Note that the future reproductive success of an individual is dependent upon its current age. I do not
model this dependency but implicitly assume that the individuals available for translocation are of optimal
age for future reproductive returns. In practice, it may or may not be feasible to meet this assumption. If not
met in a known way, it may or may not be straightforward to modify the model to allow for the particular
situation.
The fact that in some circumstances the total return function R1 of Model 1 does not a have a maximal
value on the interval [0, 1] but only a supremum (least upper bound) is disconcerting. The phenomenon
arises from the discontinuity in R1 stemming from the numerator of SP . In particular, an arbitrarily small
investment in a female beyond the packaging costs makes a contribution to R1 through its contribution to
SP . When this investment in that female decreases to an investment at the level of packaging costs, that
investment will optimally be redirected to another female and the decrease in the number of females invested
in causes SP to change discontinuously. As first noted in §8, it may then happen that the value of R1 at
the point of discontinuity y is less than the one-sided limit of R1 as x increases towards the discontinuity
y, whence R1(y − ǫ) > R1(y) for arbitrarily small positive ǫ. The limiting return limx→y− R1(x) may turn
out to be the supremum of R1 on [0, 1], but does not represent a strategy which can be implemented. The
best one can do is to choose the optimal strategy for x = y − ǫ, for some suitable and small ǫ. It remains
to be seen whether this phenomena will prove of practical import. Theoretically, however, it perhaps raises
the issue of whether it is realistic to suppose that returns on female investment increase continuously from
zero when investment exceeds the known packaging costs. Suppose instead, as with the (multi)-step-function
return, a further threshold level of investment beyond the known packaging costs is required for a nonzero
return. If at x = y some female receives exactly the threshold level of investment, as x increases toward
y, R1 is expected to vary continuously and therefore now take its value at x = y given by this limit, i.e.,
R1(y) = limx→y− R1(x). When x exceeds y, the female in question no longer yields a return and the
optimal strategy for x > y is to direct investment to another female already invested in (if such occurs) and
the numerator of SP decreases, discontinuously, by one at x = y. Now limx→y+ 6= R1(y), reflecting this
discontinuity at x = y, and one expects this limit to be less than R1(y). Thus, such threshold values would
not eliminate discontinuities from R1 but render them innocuous, as in the cases involving step-function
returns. As with multi-step-function returns, for a return function with a threshold value beyond packaging
costs for a nonzero return, the argument of Appendix A which prescribes equitable partition of resources in
a given gender as optimal will be violated.
Recall that the model of this paper was designed to optimize the returns of the translocated animals
in line with Linklater’s proposal to optimize genetic flow into the target population. As such, the optimal
strategy provided by this model is not necessarily the optimal strategy as regards reproductive performance
of the target population, as this latter goal may not coincide with that of maximizing the reproductive
performance of the translocated individuals. As indicated in the introduction, meta-population management
involves a number of issues, of which I have considered just one. To indicate one aspect of this point, consider
a scenario in which male returns are sigmoid, with Z = 0.01, L = 10, p = 0.3, and d = 0.05 in (6.c.3), and
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female returns are the DMR function f(z) = (1.5)[1 − (0.1/z)3] of (3.d.10). For Model 2, with S = 1, the
optimal strategy is x = 1 with investment in three males. For Model 1 (S = 1) with µ ≥ 14, the optimal
strategy is still x = 1 but with investment in 8 males. As µ decreases, so does the value of x at which the
optimal strategy occurs. When µ = 1, the optimal strategy occurs at x = 0.27 with investment in two males
and 7 females. These results are neither surprising nor objectionable. When the number of females in the
target population is small, the predictions of the model may serve the population reproductive performance
less well. Consider the extreme case when φ = 0, whence S = 0 (other model parameters as above). For
Model 2, the optimal strategy is x = 0 with investment in 6 females. For Model 1, however, the optimal
strategy depends upon the value of µ. For µ ≥ 62, Model 1 yields the same result as Model 2, but when
µ = 61 the optimal strategy occurs at x = 0.1, with investment in one male and 6 females; some investment
has been diverted from the 6 females to a single male because, according to Model 1, that investment will,
through a male’s greater reproductive potential, increase the overall return from the translocated individuals,
despite the presence of the 61 males in the target population. Perhaps more surprising, there are large values
of µ, beginning with µ = 44, for which, according to Model 1, the optimal strategy favours investment in
males at the expense of the number of females translocated, e.g., for µ = 20 the optimal strategy occurs at
x = 0.36 with investment in 3 males and five females for a net return of 10.1 versus a return of 7.1 for the
strategy of x = 0. Unless there are extenuating circumstances regarding the genetic constitution of the males
of the target population, in a case when there are few females in the target population and Model 1 predicts
an optimal strategy favoring investment in males at the expense of the number of females translocated, other
considerations may veto the recommendation of this strategy. As remarked previously, however, it remains
to be seen whether such circumstances will prove of practical importance, e.g., differences in return between
certain strategies may prove of negligible importance in practice.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix, I present a mathematical result useful for obtaining the optimal division of resources
x invested in a single gender. I use the notation appropriate for males.
Let m denote an individual return function, with packaging costs d. For fixed resources x, let Pn(x)
denote the set of partitions of x into n amounts. A particular partition
∑n
i=1 xi = x, xi ∈ [0, 1], may be
denoted P (x;x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Pn(x). Write yj := xj − d, i = 1, . . . , n. Since it is wasteful to invest no more
than d in an individual, one may suppose that xj > d, i.e., yj > 0, and
x =
n∑
i=j
xj =

 n∑
j=1
yj

+ nd, (A.1)
whence
nd < x, (A.2)
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which constrains the possible values of n. Thus, yj ∈ (0, x− nd). Put
M(x;n; y1, . . . , yn) :=
n∑
j=1
m(yj + d). (A.3)
One can perform the optimization of M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn) with respect to x1, . . . , xn and n as follows.
First, fix n subject to the constraint (A.2). The problem is then to first choose the yj so as to maximize
M(x;n; y1, . . . , yn), and then to optimize over the allowed values of n. Assuming M(x;n; y1, . . . , yn), without
constraints, is a C2 function of (y1, . . . , yn), each yj ∈ (0, x − nd), then we have a standard optimization
problem with constraints. Put h(y1, . . . , yn) =
∑n
j=1 yj− (x−nd) and L(y1, . . . , yn) := M(x;n; y1, . . . , yn)−
λh(y1, . . . , yn), where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. Then,
∂L
∂yj
= m′(yj + d)− λ j = 1, . . . , n ∂L
∂λ
= h. (A.4)
Setting these equations to zero gives the solutions for the constrained optimization: λ = m′(yj + d), j =
1, . . . , n and h = 0, i.e.,
m′(yj + d) = m
′(yk + d) for all j, k
n∑
j=1
yj = x− nd. (A.5)
The Hessian H of L is the diagonal matrix
H = diag
(
m′′(y1 + d), . . . ,m
′′(yn + d)
)
, (A.6)
evaluated at the solution of (A.5), which is nondegenerate provided each of these second derivatives is
nonzero. A sufficient condition to guarantee that the solution is a relative maximum is that m′′ < 0 at the
solution of (A.5).
As a function of (y1, . . . , yn), the domain of interest ofM(x;n; y1, . . . , yn) is yj ∈ (0, x−nd), j = 1, . . . , n,
with the constraint h = 0 restricting M to the hyperplane
∑n
j=1 yj = x−nd. If D denotes the domain of the
constrained function, i.e., D is the hyperplane slice of the open domain of M , then its closure is compact and
at any point of its boundary, D\D, some yj must be zero. As a constrained function of (y1, . . . , yn), for fixed
x and n, if M has a maximum on its domain D, it must occur at a critical point, which are characterized
by (A.5). Otherwise, the ‘maximum ’ of M occurs on the boundary of D. Now, the constrained function is
continuous, so this maximum can be obtained in a continuous fashion. But, at that boundary point, some
yj = 0, i.e., one is assigning resources d to the j’th individual. This tactic is nonoptimal. It is no worse to
reassign the resources d to the other n− 1 individuals, i.e., there is a partition P (x;x1, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Pn−1(x)
that is at least as optimal as any partition in Pn(x). Note that the return function M(x;n;x1, . . . , xn), now
viewed as a function of (n, x1, . . . , xn), may change discontinuously with the change from n to n− 1 in the
reassignment of the resources d from the abandoned individual.
The observations of the previous paragraph entail that the optimal investment of resources x occurs at
a solution of (A.5) for one of the allowed values of n given by (A.2). In practice, one can begin with the
largest allowed value of n, solve (A.5) for local maxima, and then proceed to smaller values of n, stopping
with n = 1 (investing in no individuals is nonoptimal!). The optimal strategy can be identified from this list
of possibilities (if there are no critical points, the optimal strategy is to invest in a single individual).
APPENDIX B
We have seen that for the continuous return functions of §3 the optimal investment of resources x
in a specific gender (say males) may always be construed as equitable division of resources amongst some
number nx of individuals satisfying (A.2): M(x) = nxm(x/nx). Now M(x) = m(x) when x ∈ [0, 2d], with
nx = 0 on [0, d] and nx = 1 on (d, 2d]. On
(
sd, (s+ 1)d
]
, it is possible to invest in s males, and the optimal
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strategy at x ∈ (sd, (s+1)d) is determined by the relative values of m(x), 2m(x/2), . . . , sm(x/s). Whichever
of these functions is largest at such an x is also, by continuity, largest near that x. Indeed, one may view
the construction of M(x) as follows. Construct the graphs of each of the functions fn(x) := nm(x/n), for
those positive integers n satisfying nd < 1. This is a finite number of continuous graphs. On [0, 2d] all but
f1(x) are zero. So M(x) will be continued by f1(x) = m(x) beyond x = 2d until one of fn(x) equals and
then exceeds m(x). This process repeats for the remainder of the domain [0, 1] of M whence M is seen to
be made up of pieces of the graphs of fn(x), joined continuously together. Thus,M(x) is indeed continuous.
For linear returns m(x) = a(x − d), mn(x) = a(x − nd) which is parallel to m. Thus, M(x) = m(x)
as deduced in §3b. For an IMR return m, observe that m′n(x) = m′(x/n) < m′(x) by definition of IMR
returns. Thus, as with linear returns, no mn can intersect m and again M(x) = m(x) as deduced in §3c.
This same argument, applied to sigmoid returns, establishes that no mn can intersect m for x ≤ p, whence
M(x) = m(x) on [0, p] as argued in §3e.
DMR return functions give a particularly simple picture. With j > i ≥ 1 and jd < 1, suppose that
fj(x) = fi(x), for some point xi,j ∈ (jd, 1]. Since f ′j(x) = m′(x/j) > m′(x/i) = f ′i(x), then at the intersection
xi,j , fj does indeed cross over the graph of fi. If, for fixed i, xi,j < xi,k whenever k > j, then
M(x) =


m(x), x ∈ [0, x12];
f2(x), x ∈ [x1,2, x2,3];
f3(x), x ∈ [x2,3, x3,4];
...
...
For the functions h and g of (3.d.10), and with r = 1/s > 1 for h, one finds, respectively,
xi,j =
ij(jr − ir)d
ijr − jir xi,j =
s
√
js+1 − is+1
j − i d =
s
√
js + js−1i+ · · ·+ jis−1 + is d. (B.1)
Note that ijr − jir > 0 for r > 1, and both the functions in (B.1) are increasing functions of j for fixed i
when j ≥ i. Curiously, both functions are proportional to d, but this fact is a coincidence (one can construct
other DMR functions that do not share this property). Putting s = 1 in the formula for g, one obtains the
particularly simple result that xi,j = (j + i)d. Since xi+1,i+2 − xi+1,i = 2d, in this case
M =


m(x), x ∈ [0, 3d];
2m(x/2), x ∈ [3d, 5d];
3m(x/3), x ∈ [5d, 7d];
...
...
(B.2)
For the sigmoid function of (6.c.1), one does not obtain an explicit formula for xi,j .
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